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EN000ENOUS EXCHANGE RATE REGIME SWITCHES
AESTRACT
In this paper we demonstrate that exchange rate regime switching is compatible
with optimal government policies. Nominal exchange-rate regimes are
formalized as equilibrium commitments on future seigniorage policies, and the
collapse of an exchange-rate peg as an excusable default which allows the
government to lump-sum tax private sector money holdings. We demonstrate that
a regime in which the exchange-rate peg is allowed to collapse when government
spending is unusually high is a trigger-strategy equilibrium. Such a regime
can be superior to both fixed and flexible exchange rate because it combines
some of the flexibility of the floating exchange rates with some of the
benefits of precommitment afforded by fixed rates.
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1. Introduction
Several recent studies have analyzed the properties of alternative
exchange rate regimes. York begun in papers by Kelpman and Razin [1979] and
Relp'uan fl981 compared the welfare levels achievable under a fullyflexible
and a fixed exchange rate system. The authors showed that, in a highly
simplified environment, the choice of the exchange system is irrelevant in the
sense that the individual opportunity set is invariant across alternative
exchange rate arrangements. This neutrality property tends to break down when
richer analytical models are considered. For example, Helpman and Razin
[1982]andAschauer and Greenwood [1983] discuss cases in which a flexible
exchange rate regime is superior to a fixed exchange rate regime. In general,
however, it is difficult to provide an unambiguous ranking. Another line of
research, initiated by Krugman [1987], Flood and Garber [1989], and Froot and
Obstfeld [1989] ,hasconcentrated on the properties of a band-type system.
But these studies have focused on the exchange rate stabilization effect of
this type of system and not strictly on its welfare implications.
These analyses are conducted under the implicit assumption that a country
makes an irrevocable decision to operate under one particular system. There
is ample evidence, however, that policy makers "change their minds." It is
not rare, in fact, to observe a country abandoning a fixed exchange rate or
moving from free floating to some form of exchange rate control. The past
hundred years of financial history have been characterized by switches from
fixed exchange arrangements (e.g. Gold Standard, Gold-Exchange Standard,
Bretton-Voods) to flexible exchange rate regimes (the ihterwar flexible
periods and the post-1972 floating period). A more recent system like the EMS
can be interpreted as a mixture of fixed and flexible regimes: usually theexchange rate is pegged around its official central parity, but sometimes it
is left to drift away from the parity, and at other times the parity itself is
changed.
The existence of switches between fixed and flexible exchange rates has
long been recognized and has been the subject of a consistent body of
research. Starting with Salant and Henderson [1978] and Krugman [1979]
several papers have been written on the topic of speculative attacks and
collapses of fixed exchange rates. In most of this literature, however, these
switches are seen as the result of incompatible monetary and exchange rate
policies ,thusruling out any rationale for this type of occurrence.
Moreover, while much attention has been devoted to the forced abandonment of
the fixed exchange rate, a similar effort has not been made to understand the
welfare consequences of speculative attacks or the motives that would lead the
authorities to fix the exchange rate. In fact, most of the speculative attack
literature offers no justification for fixed exchange rate policies.
In this paper we show that exchange rate collapses may be consistent with
optimal policies. Ve illustrate how superficially inconsistent policies--in
this instance monetary growth that is incompatible with a previously announced
fixed exchange rate--can be understood as part of a more complex regime in
which the policy maker in well-defined circumstances is allowed an excusable
default on the commitment to a fixed exchange rate. The analysis is based on
a model in which policy makers use distortionary income taxation and
seigniorage to finance an exogenously given expenditure stream. The policy
maker has an incentive to generate surprise inflation to lump-sum tax money
balances and, unless she can precommit future inflation, the equilibrium of
the model is inefficient. flowever, as Barro and Gordon [l983a,b] have shown,
an equilibrium superior to the time-consistent one can be implemented if the3
policy maker cares sufficiently about future outcomes andtheprivate sector
"punishes" her for surprise inflation by losing confidence in her resolve not
to generate inflation surprises in the future. In this case, the inefficiency
of future equilibria that would result if the private sector loses confidence
deters the policy maker from generating surprise inflation. Bowever,
deterrence may not be sufficient to prevent surprise inflation in all states
of nature. As &otemberg and Saloner [1986] have shown in the context of an
oligopoly example, there may exist other types of equilibria in which
temporary breakdowns of cooperation (i.e. when deterrence is insufficient) do
not preclude cooperation in other statest.The collapse of an exchange rate
peg may be understood in exactly this way, as an excusable default on ,a
commitment to a fixed rate that allows the policy maker to meet unusually
large government spending by generating unexpected inflation, that is, by
imposing a lump-sum tax on money balances. Support for this interpretation
can be found in Figure 1, which reveals that historically the collapse of
fixed exchange rate regimes coincided with periods of sudden rises in
government expenditures while the return to pegged exchange rates has
coincided with the return of expenditure to nornal levels. In this figure, we
plot both seigniorage and government expenditure (both as a fraction of
domestic product) of the United Kingdom2. Unshaded areas correspond to
periods in which the exchange rate was officially pegged.The association
between expenditure levels and the exchange rate system is quite striking.
The plan of the paper is as follows.The next section discusses and
motivates a simple model of optimal seigniorage. In sections 3 and 4 the
ICanzoneriand flenderson [1988] provide an application of this result in a
policy coordination context. —
2 Seigniorageis measured as the rate of monetary growth multiplied by the
real monetary base.4
model is used to analyze the welfare properties of alternative exchange-rate
regimes and to demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium regime that allows
for the collapse and refixing of the exchange rate. Finally, the concluding
section summarizes the results and discusses possible further research.
2. The lodel
The model is designed to highlight the constraints on government
financial policies imposed by alternative exchange rate regimes.Thus, we
assume a small open economy that takes world prices and interest rates as
given.Vorld prices and interest rates are assumed to be constant and
domestic and foreign goods to be perfect substitutes. Consequently,
purchasing power parity holds and government seigniorage policy is the crucial
determinant of nominal exchange-rate behavior, since the rate of exchange
depreciation equals the domestic rate of inflation,
s-s t i-I t t-J
(2.1) = = 1+
t-1 t-i
where is the exchange rate (domestic currency price of foreign currency),
Ft is the domestic price level, and rj the inflation rate. The analysis
focuses on the decision problem of a policy maker who seeks to minimize the
cost of financing an exogenous stream of real government expenditure, {}7O
We implicitly assume a private sector whose members have rational expectations
—andwhose demand for real money balances depends on expected inflation.
The analysis is simplified considerably by taking C to be the
government's revenue requirement after transactions in government bonds and
foreign exchange. Thus, the policy maker chooses tax and money financing to3
satisfy the government budget constraint,
(2.2) Q = +
where and Iaretax revenues and the nominal stock of high powered money
outstanding. By pushing government borrowing and reserve use into the
background, we are able to focus more clearly on the long-run factors
underlying exchange-rate regime switches, illustrated in figure 1, although we
thereby preclude the analysis of the short-run dynamics of the transition from
one regime to another.3
Ye normalize government budget constraint by expressing variables as
ratios to CliP,
(2.3) gtn;t*st
where is the rate of government spending out of CliP, r is the average
income tax rate, and is seigniorage revenues relative to CliP.To simplify
the exposition we assume s to be a linear function of anticipated and
unanticipated inflation,
(2.4) s c1(r1 -r1)
+c2r1, c1,c2 >0
-where = is the expected rate of inflation between period t-! and
period t, and is the actual rate of inflation from period t-l to period
3 Transitions as analyzed in the speculative attack literature are not
inconsistent with our model. In fact, we consider our analysis to be
complementary to that literature.6
and denotes an expectation conditional on information available in period
t.Here c2 is meant to capture the revenue from the distortionary taxation on
money holdings associated with expected inflation, and c1 the revenue from the
lump-sum taxation of nominal government liabilities associated with surprise
inflation.Note that by restricting c2 to exceed zero, we are implicitly
assuming the inflation-tax Laffer curve to be upward sloping at rates of
inflation relevant to our analysis. We shall also assume that the parameters
and remain constant across the different exchange rate regimes that we
analyze.
The cost of financing government expenditures has four components: the
excess burden of income taxes, the liquidity cost of (smaller money holdings
arising from) anticipated inflation, the menu costs of actual inflation, and
the cost of resource misallocation resulting from unanticipated inflation. A










wherefi, 0<fi ￿I ,isthe policy maker's discount factor, and will be
referred to as a one-period loss function. This loss function can be viewed
as capturing, approximately, costs borne by a representative individual. Note
also that the liquidity costs in period t depend on expected inflation from
that period to the next, r ,althoughit would not be possible for a policy
maker who cannot precommit future policies to influence these expectations7
directly.
Finally, it is assumed that the government spending rate out of GNP is
serially independent, with mean g and variance ?,andhas bounded support
!' ]'with0<g << t.
Tn the absence of mechanisms that enable policy makers to precommit
future policies credibly, the equilibrium of the model is inefficient.The
sourceof the inefficiency is well known from the literature on
time-consistent monetary policy (lydland and Prescott [1977], Calvo [1978a,
b]):from the policy maker's point of view, private sector real money
holdings (or expectations of inflation) at the end of the preceding period are
given. This creates an incentive to impose a capital levy on money balances
through unanticipated inflation. Private agents recognize this incentive and
choose real money holdings small enough to eliminate it. As a result, the
equilibrium is characterized by an average inflation rate exceeding that which
a policy maker who can preconunit to a fixed rate of inflation would choose.
In other words, the economy can be said to have an inflation bias stemming
from a precommitment externality.
In this paper a nominal exchange-rate regime is viewed as a commitment to
a set of future seigniorage policies. Such a commitment, if credible, enables
the policy maker to fix private sector expectations. The exchange rate is a
convenient indicator of government policies.It is responsive to policy
changes and widely observed and, therefore, easy for private agents to
monitor.Thus, it is reasonable to "write" an implicit social contract on
seigniorage in terms of the exchange rate, even if such a contract need not be
particularly simple.8
3Permanently Fixedvs.Permanently Floating Exchange tates
A permanent exchange-rate peg can be viewed as a commitment on the part
ofgovernment never to use the seigniorage tax.Itenables the policy maker
to fix private sector expectations of inflation at the cost of giving up the
use of seigniorage altogether. A free float, on the other hand, allows the
policy makef the flexibility to adjust income tax rates and inflation in
response to government spending. As a simple way of capturing the potential
cot of mànetary independence, we assume that under a float the policy maker
cannot precomnit, that is, the equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium of the
seigniorage pOlicy game.
Under a permanent float, the policy maker in each period chooses the
income tax rate and inflation rate so as to minimize the cost of taxation,
taking as given government spending and private sector real money holdings.
Because current policy actions do not affect future outcomes, the policy maker





(3.2) =+ e7(r1- r1)+
c2
withr1 taken as given. The first-order condjtions for tax and inflation
rates,
(3.3) (s +ay)rj
= +along with the government budget constraint, eq. (3.2), yield the equilibrium
taxand inflationrates under a float as
(3.4) r = + a1
+
a5
2 (Yg - 57 + a+a
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since is i.i.d., and
















where the superscript "F" refers to equilibrium values of variables under
floating exchange rates.
A govenazent deciding which exchange rate system to choose, will evaluate
the loss functions conditional on information available in the planning period
i-i.Thus, using eqs. (3.4) and (3.5), we easily find that expected losses














Ifexchange rates are fixed permanently, both actual and expected
inflation rates are equal to zero at all times. As a result, taxes and the
minimized value of the policy maker's loss function are given by
(3.8) <=
and
(3.9) f =E1jU2{a4[P]2} = {2
+







we obtain the necessary and sufficient condition for floating exchange rates11
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+ a4c1c2)
Thecosts of floating are increasing in the average government spending rate
(or revenue requirement) because high average spending implies a high expected
inflation rate in a float.On the other band, the benefits of a flexible
exchange rate regimes are increasing in the variance of the government
a 4
spendingrate, as indicated by the expression 4
•inequation
a1 + + a4c1
(3.10). This term captures the value of flexibility, that is, the value of
the policy maker's being able to generate surprise in(de)flation under
floating .Thus,our model predicts that a permanent float will be preferred
in countries with low but highly volatile government spending4
A regime of floating exchange rates may be preferred even if government
spending were nonstochastic. This would be the case when Ic is negative, that
(3.13) a4c1c2




4SeeBarro (1983) for a similar result.12
Thus, a float is more desirable the greater the revenue from fully anticipated
inflation (a2), the smaller the liquidity cost of inflation relative to its
direct cost (a2 -a1),
and the greater the revenue from surprise inflation
relative to that from fully anticipated inflation (a2- a2). Intuitively,
(a2-a1) and (a1 -a2)
are measures of the cost of the policy maker's inability
to precommit inflation: the greater (a2 -a1),the smaller the cost entailed
by the policy maker's inability to take into account the effect of his
anticipated actions on real money holdings in the preceding period; and the
greater (a -a2),the greater the incentive to generate surprise inflation
and hence the higher the equilibrium inflation rate in the time-coosistent
equilibrium. Note also that if there is no excess burden of income taxation,
a4 =0, thetwo regimes are equivalent. This can be seen from eqs. (2.3) aod
(3.5), which indicate that =0 andthat = if
a4
=
Itis clear, howevet, that a pegged exchange rate, even if preferable to
a float on average, need not be preferred in all states of nature.
Specifically, suppose that, if the policy maker resorts to unanticipated
inflation (a devaluation of the domestic currency), private agents would lose
confidence in the exchange rate peg forever and expect the policy maker to use
discretionary seigniorage in all subsequent periods. Even if this "punishment
mechanism" exists, the policy maker may have an incentive to generate an
inflation surprisein periods with extraordinarily high government
expenditures:The incentive to reduce the cost of income taxation at
extraordinarily high rates may outweigh the cost of being in a floating rate
regime afterwards.13
4.Endogenoma Exchange late legime Switching
Inthis section we demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium exchange
rateregime in which transitions between fixed and floating exchange rates are
endogenous.In this regime the commitment to the exchange rate peg is
understood to be a contingent one. The public knows that the government will,
in well-defined circumstances, break its commitment to the simple exchange
rate peg and loses confidence in the policy maker only if he resorts to the
discretionary use of seigniorage outside these circumstances. Such a mixed or
adjustable peg regime allows the government to trade off an inefficient
average inflation rate for the ability to "lumpsum"5tax money balances when
governmentspendingis unusually high; it dominates the polar extremes of
permanently fixed and freely flexible exchange rates for a large subset of
possible values of the parameters of the model.
A fixed exchange rate that is subject to collapse wben government
spending is unusually high can be formalized as a trigger-strategy equilibrium
of the seigniorage policy game that we have outlined:Under fairly general
conditions, there exists a trigger government spending rate out of GNP, g
such that the government will maintain the exchange rate peg when the actual
spending rate, g ,fallsshort of 9* and will collapse the exchange rate by
resorting to unanticipated inflation when >g. Theprivate sector,
recognizing the policy maker's incentives, will punish the government by
losing confidence in the exchange-rate regime (playing Nash) forever only if
*
thegovernment uses discretionary seigniorage at spending rates below g
Properly speaking, unanticipated inflation is not a lump- sum tax in this
model. In fact, we have assumed that unanticipated inflation is
distortionary, because of its redistributive effects (that is, a3 '0).
Still, since agents cannot preemptively reduce their money holdings when
inflation is unexpected, unanticipated inflation does not have liquidity
costs. It is in this sense that it has elements of a lump-sum tax.14
Formally,the equilibrium trigger is defined as follows.Let BC(g
denote the benefit, and C (g )thecost, of collapsing the exchange rate peg
when it is not justified--an action that we will refer to as the policy maker
'reneging" diithecommitment to the exchange rate regime. Then the
*
equilibriumtrigger, g ,satisfiesone of the following three conditions:
t(g,g) =C'(g,and
(4.1) Bc(U,Y )>C(2 ), Yj> g ,and
B°(g,g) < Cc(g) <
(42) =gif BC(g,)< for all [g ,
=[fBt(g,g) > CC(g), for all e '
Eq.(4.1) defines the equilibrium for an adjustable peg regime, that is the
- *
casewhere g < g c g. It states that g is the highest government spending
rate at which the private sector's los of confidence can deter the policy
maker from setting the exchange rate afloat and generating surprise inflation.
A permanent peg corresponds to an equilibrium trigger equal to g. According
to (4.2) it is an equilibrium exchange-rate regime if the cost of collapsing
exceeds the benefits at all possible values of when the private agents
expect the government to maintain the peg forever. Similarly, eq. (4.3)
states that a permanent float is an equilibrium when the policy maker never
has an incentive to peg the rate if the private agents expect her mat to do
so.15
In the case analyzed before, the policy maker made a once and for all
choice of exchange-rate regime. Nov we consider a situation where the policy
maker in each period decides whether to maintain the exchange-rate regime or
to renege. In this situation, the policy maker's present actions affect the
exchange-rate regime and hence losses from next period onwards. For ease of
exposition,we shall compare the benefit of reneging on the mixed
exchange-rate regime (which are reaped in the current period), with the costs
(which are borne in the future). This allows us to treat the policy maker's
choice in parallel fashion with the analysis up to now.
4.1 Existence of an Equilibrium Trigger
To illustrate the conditions for existence of an equilibrium trigger, we
consider the benefits and costs of collapsing the exchange rate peg when it is
not justified, that is, when <
Consider first the benefits from reneging on the mixed exchange rate
regime. Benefits arise only in the current period, and are given by
(4.4) 3C(9 9*1 9t< 9 )L(g, 9I i<) - L(9,gIc< 9
where £'(9j, 9* 9< g )denotesthe policy maker's one-period loss function
if the exchange rate is kept fixed, and gg< g )isthe one-period
loss uujctio if the exchange rate is collapsed. Note that both L(g,
and ttt' g )dependon the value of the trigger; the reason is that private
agenU' expectations of inflation in a mixed regime depend on g,asthe
*
notationr(g )willemphasize.
The cost of collapsing the exchangerate peg when it is not Justified
equals the discounted cost of being in a floating rate regime rather than a16
mixed regime from the next period onwards, and can be written as
(4.5) ((*)fi(/ -
whereI' and are the policymaker's minimized loss functions under floating
and in the mixed regime. The loss function under -a mized regime is given by
jf(g*) =1
fr1
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wheref(g*) is the probahility that 9j < Usingthe definition of the
policymaker's loss function under floating and eq. (4.5), the cost of reneging
can be written as -17





The cost of reneging on the exchange rate regime equals the discounted cost of
being in a floating regime forever, adjusted by the cost of having a non-zero
expected rate of inflation under pegging, plus the cost of forgoing the
ability to engineer excusable exchange-rate collapses under a mixed regime.
Details of the derivation and the exact expressions for both
çC(g ),and1 (g )aregiven in the Appendix.
To simplify the notation, ye use (9j9t) to denote the net benefit of
reneging on the exchange-rate regime,
(4.8) ø(set)S t(g,gt)
-((*)
Thenan equilibrium mixed exchange-rate regime that is, an equilibrium trigger
* * —
satisfyingeqs. (4.1) to (4.3), exists if there is a value of g ,g￿ g ￿ g
such that°
*S




Recallthat g =correspond to a permanent peg and gg to a free
+
floating,respectively. Therefore, a true mixed regime requires g CC g.18
In the following we makethefairly unrestrictive assumption that:
(4.11) °2 -c)
<
that is, expected inflation cannot be a much more effective source of revenue
than unexpected inflation. In fact, we would in general expect the opposite
to be true. Ye can now prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 4.1: and thus Ø(gg*), are monotonically increasing in
gt.






Therefore,given (4.11), f{t(g,g)} > 0,always. From the definition (4.9)
of *(•)itis clear that 4-_{(g,gt)} 4_{Rc(99*)} U.
Notice that Lemma 4-1 guarantees that condition (4.10) is always
satisfied.
The dftcussion of existence is simplified by considering a trigger
function, gI(g*) defined by19
(4.13) gT(g4) =if #(flj9') c aforg ￿ flg￿ 9
=gif #(9p9t) ' 0 for g ￿ and
7 7*
g such that (g ,g )= 0otherwise.
7* *
Thus, the function g (p )mapsvalues of g into [p , asfollows. If for a
given pt there is a value of that equates the implied costs and benefits of
reneging on the exchange rate regime, the trigger function picks out this
7 *
value, denoted by p ,asa candidate trigger.If for p the costs of
reneging on the exchange rate regime exceed the benefits (#(gg'Pt) c 0) for
all g, the trigger function picks ,thatis a permanent peg.Finally, it
logically picks a permanent float as a candidate equilibrium if the benefits
of reneging exceed the costs at all possible values of p. An equilibrium
trigger is a fixed point of the "trigger function" map, that is, a p
satisfying
7* *
(4.14) p (p )= p
as illustrated in figure 2.Thus, to prove the existence of an equilibrium
7*
adjustable peg exchange rate regime, we have to show that p (p )continuously
maps the [p ,7] intervalinto itself.For the regime to include the
possibility of occasional collapses, however, the fixed point of the trigger
function should occur in the interior of [p,7] .Noifetheless,to establish the
existence of an interior fixed point, is important to cbaracteri2e what
happens at the boundaries of the support of This is the purpose of the
following two lemmas.Lemma 4.2: g is an equilibrium trigger.
*
Proof:Recall that when g g a mixed regime is equivalent to a
permanent float. Therefore, from (4.5) we obtain that c°(g) =0.Front the









thatis >C°(g) 0 at all values of g, as shown in figure 3(a).
Therefore, by (4.13), gf(g*) =I
Intuitively,the policy makerwillalways prefer to choose
optimally, since reneging is costless when the exchange rate is expected to
float forever from the next period onwards. As a corollary of lemma 4.2
notice that, since (g,gt) is continuous in andgt,(g,gt) )0V for
g totheneighborhood of g.
Similarly,
Lemma 4.3:If a permanent peg is time consistent, j is an equilibrium
trigger.
Proof: By definition, a permanent peg is time consistent if c 0,
or B°(g,) <CC(j),for all asshown in figure 3(b).Thus, by (4.13),
gTG) =.•
-
Asa corollary of lemma 4.3 notice that c 0 V for in the21
neighborhood of q by continuity of
Before proving the existence of an interior equilibrium trigger is
convenient to prove the following two results:
Lenuna 4.4: If a permanent peg is time consistent, the cost of an
unjustified collapse is globally increasing in the trigger spending rate.
V
Proof:Note, first, that when g =g,a mixed regime is equivalent to a
permanent peg, and thus L(g 'j)= L9.Consequently, (4.5) reduces to
= -C°),which is positive because a permanent peg, to be time
consistent, must be superior to a permanent float, that is I> ii',Recalling
from Lemma 4.2 that C'(g)=0,weobtain C'()' ff(9)= 0.
Lemma 4.5:The benefit of an unjustified collapse is monotonically
decreasing in the trigger spending rate, that is, Ot/Dg* <0.




{44c19g Dy a1+ a3+a4c1
+ + a4c1(c1 -
c2)]r(g*)}
+
where,from (A.8) in the appendix:
*
* - - a,c1f(g)
(4.17)r'(g )= I
F(g)(a1 + a3 +a4c7)
+( .7
-F(g))(°+ a4c1c2)22










Condition(4.11) guarantees that r'(g), and thus oBC/8g ,arenegative.
We are now in the position to prove the following proposition which
establishes the existence of an equilibrium mixed exchange-rate regiin.
Pronosition 4.1:If a permanent peg is incentive compatible, there
* *—
existsan equilibrium trigger, g,suchthat g <g<g.
Proof: We have to show that there always is a closed subset of [g ,lg],
such that gT(g) continuously maps [g1,g2J into [g ,9] .Recall
that, by Lemma 4.5, t(9L,9 )ismonotonically decreasing in g .IfC(g
were monotonically increasing in p ,theproof of the existence of a fixed
point would be straightforward.In this case, in fact, we could define an
interval [111,92J(g<g<g2< g) such that (g 'ii) =0and '2 =
Therefore,p7(g) =fo: and 1'() =for g. F:r all values
of psuch that g< p < 9 ,p(p )isdefined by *(,g) 0.By
continuity of *(s4) p7(p) continuously maps into [p ,
loreover,because of the monotonicity of t(g,g') and C0(p), also 7(g*) is
monotonic, which guarantees the uniqueness of the (interior) fixed point. The
* 7*
monotonicity of C(g )isnot guaranteed, however. In this case, p (p )need
not be monotonic, nor the (interior) equilibrium unique Nevertheless, the
existence of at least one interior fixed point can be proved, following the23
same type of argument used above. The reason why this is true can be seen by
7*
considering a transition between the definition of p (p )asthe solution to
(g7g*) =0and = because *(gt,g*)0 V g. Because nC(g,g)
monotonically increasing in andC(p )isindependent of g, such
transitions between always occur at =p.Similarly, transition between the
definition of p (p )asthe solution to (p ,p )0and p =pbecause
Ø(g,p) <0V p always occur at 7 =j.Thus,since C(pt) is globally
increasing, see Lemma 4.4, it is always possible to define an interval [g1,p2]
such that g7(p) =p,p7() =and Ø(gt,g*) U for Pj< P Pp
•
7*
Figure 4(a) illustrates an example of p (p ).Lemma4.2 established that
>0V p. By continuity of *(c) p7(p*) p for :ome interval [g,
as represented by the initial horizontal segment of p (p ).Analogously,
Lemma 4.3 established that (Pj'I)<0V p, if a fixed exchange rate is time
consistent.Fence, by continuity, p7(p') =pfor some interval [sd' p] ,as
represented by the final horizontal segment of p (p ).
Inthis example it is assumed that the nonmonotonicity of CC(g)
produces an interior interval of such that for p [pg]
Ø(gg )>0V p. Jumps in the value of p ,asshown at p in figure 4(b),
cannot occur because transitions between the definition of p (p )asthe
solution to 0and p7 =pbecause •*(gjP) >0V p always occur at
97=9•
—
Finally,it should be emphasized that the conditions assumed are
sufficient but certainly not necessary for the existence of an equilibrium
mixed exchange rate regime. In particular, although Proposition 4.1 is based
on the assumption that a permanent peg is_time consistent, the examples in
section 5 will show that a mixed exchange rate regime may be an equilibrium24
even if a permanent peg is not incentive compatible. Figure 5 illustrates the
equilibrium in this case. Vhen a permanent peg is not time consistent, *(j,g)
>0,therefore g1(j) c j,asshown in the figure. lultiple equilibria arise
naturally in this case: both ,q and gare equilihrium trigger spending
rates.
4.2 Yelf are under an Adjustable Peg Regime
An adjustable peg regime allows the policy maker the use of unanticipated
inflation, generally presumed to be a very efficient source of revenue, when
the government revenue requirement is unusually high. It does so at the cost
of an inefficiently high expected rate of inflation; costly inflation
expectations errors occur in periods when spending is low. In this section we
show that the benefits may outweigh the cost: an adjustable peg may dominate
both permanent peg and a permanent float, Ve take the trigger spending rate
as a parameter and show that under intuitively plausible conditions an
S
equilibriumregime with g sufficiently close to g will dominate a permanent
peg. Since we still assume that the peg is time consistent, this also implies
that the mixed regime also dominates a free float.
The minimized value of the policy maker's intertemporal loss function
under an adjustable peg is given by
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Fromeq. (LAO) in the appendix, it follows that
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ilence,an adjustable peg is superior to a permanent peg for g sufficiently
close to (L <if
(4.22)
c1 -
thatis, if the upper limit of is high enough relative to its wean which
is, again, a condition about the variability of g. A bigh variance of
will favor a mixed regime over a permanent peg.26
5.An Example
Ve have shown that an equilibrium adjustable peg (or mixed) exchange rate
regime exists if a permanent peg is incentive compatible and that such a
*
regime may be snperior to both a permanent float and a permanent peg if p
happens to be close to .Itis not clear, however, that the equilibrium
adjustable peg regime corresponding to a particular set of parameter values
would in fact dominate the polar extremes of pegged or freely floating
exchange rates. To address this issue we now turn to some numerical examples
that confirm the existence of equilibrium adjustable peg regimes that dominate
free floating and permanent pegs, not only when a permanent peg is credible
but also when it is not and even when free floating is superior to a permanent
peg.
In the examples, we assume that government spending is uniformly
distributed, with upper and lower bounds equal to 65 percent and 5 percent of
GNP respectively. Thus the expected value of government spending equals 35
percent and it variance approximately 3 percent of GNP. The parameters of the
policy maker's loss function are as follows: a7 =0.004,2 =0.005and
0.03. In other words, the marginal cost of income taxation is six times
the marginal liquidity cost and seven and a half times the marginal menu cost
of inflation for r r. Finally, c is assumed to equal 0.08; unanticipated
inflation at 1 percent per period yields government revenue equal to 0.08
percent of GNP. Variations in c2, a and fiareused to generate the different
examples.
—
Figure6 illustrates the existence of a welfare improving adjustable peg
when a permanent peg cannot be implemented [B0(j ,) > .Itis based
on the assumption that, c2 =0.06,and fi= 0.35and a5 =0.002.Thus,27
unanticipated inflation is assumed not to be very costly (a5 c a1 c a2), as
would be the case if the indexation is widespread. The top panel shows the
equilibrium trigger spending rate as the intersection of the cost of reneging,
Ct(gt) ,andthe benefit of doing so when current government spending out of
CNP equals the trigger spending rate, 3 (g ,g ).Thereare two equilibria
at trigger spending rates equal to 0.205 and 0.435. These equilibria
correspond to the exchange rate being peg 26 percent and 64 percent of the
time under an adjustable peg regime, respectively. The bottom panel plots the
minimized values of the policy maker's loss function under alternative
exchange rate regimes against the trigger.In this case a permanent peg is
superior to a free float, while an adjustable peg dominates the permanent peg
when the equilibrium trigger exceeds 0.265. Thus the adjustable peg regime
corresponding to the equilibrium trigger equal to 0.435 is superior to both
*
permanentlyfixed and freely floating exchange rates, while the one with •g
equal to 0.205 dominates a free float but not a permanent peg.
The case in which a permanent peg is incentive-compatible is shown in
figure 7.The figure is drawn assuming that c2 0.07, and fi= 0.5and
a3 =0.03--unanticipatedinflation is costly as the same rate as income
taxation. In this example the equilibrium mixed regime is unique and
I
correspondsto an equilibrium trigger, g ,equalto about 0.15. As the lower
panelshows; itdominates apermanentpegand a freefloat.
Finally, figure 8, which assumes c5 =0.09,and fi= 0.5and a3 =0.002
illustrates a case in which a free float is superior to a permanent peg.
There are two equilibrium mixed regimes. Both dominate the polar extremes of
free floating and permanent pegging.The equilibrium values of the trtgger
are 0.18 and 0.395. They correspond to regimes in which the exchange rate is
allowed to float 78 and 42.5 percent of the time, respectively.28
The results illustrated by these examples are surprisingly robust.In
contrast with the theoretical analysis, the examples require few special
assumptions to generate equilibrium adjustable peg regimes that dominate free
floating and permanent pegs.
6. Conclusions
In this paper a simple model of of exchange rate determination was used
to interpret alternative nominal exchange-rate regimes as commitments on
future seigniorage policies. Ye interpreted the abandonment of a fixed
exchange rate as an excusable default on the commitment to a particular set of
seigniorage policies which, in well defined situations, allows the government
to tax private sector money holdings by unanticipated inflation.Thus, what
superficially appears to be inconsistent policies, can be viewed as part of a
more complex regime of state contingent policies that partially internalize
precommitment externalities by simple rules.This arrangement allows the
policy maker some flexibility in states of nature when simple rules are not
incentive compatible.
A simple model of optimal taxation was used to analyze three exchange
rate regimes: a permanent peg, a free float, and a mixed peg-floating regime.
A free float allows the policy maker revenue flexibility at the cost of lack
of precommitment of future inflation. -Itis most desirable in the face of
considerable uncertainty about future government financing needs. A permanent
exchange rate peg, while avoiding precomniitment externalities, does so at the
expense of the government being unable to spread the excess burden of taxation
over taxes and seigniorage. Yhether a permanent peg would be preferred to a
free float depends on both the stochastic properties of government expenditure
and the parameters of the model.Even if a permanent peg is preferred, ex29
ante, to a free float, it way be impossible to implement it, because the
government may not have the necessary precommitment technology. In this case,
we show that a free float is not necessarily the only outcome. Ye demonstrate
that it is possible to support a mixed regime, that is an exchange rate peg
that sometime collapses in the face of large spending shocks, as a
trigger-strategy equilibrium. Ye also show, with simulation exercises, that
this mixed regime can be superior, from a welfare point of view, to either a
permanent float and a permanent peg (even if the permanent peg were incentive
compatible).
Our purpose is to provide a framework capable of reconciling exchange
rate pegging and collapses with optimal government policies. The specifics of
the analysis, based on budgetary problems, is most directly applicable to the
experience of developing countries and of industrial countries in extremely
adverse circumstances, like wars. However, the idea of optimal exchange rate
regime switches is more general. For example, one could obtain similar
results by assuming that the state variable triggering a regime switch isthe
real exchange rate, instead of government spending. This alternative approach
may be more appropriate in modeling the recent experience of EMS countries.30
Appendix
1. Derivation of the..Benef it Function
Ve cancompute£(gt, g
Ig<g )bysolving the one-period
optimization problem of a policy maker who reneges:
(1.1) lie +a2(r')2
+ - r(g*))2+a4}, t
,2—I
subject to
(A.2) g =+ cj[rj-(+)J + c2r(g)
Notice that two different expected rates of inflation: and r(g) appear in
(A.i).The policy maker takes into adcount that if he reneges, expected
inflation from the time of the collapse onward would be the one corresponding
to a floating rate regime (that is based on equation (3.5)). Rowever, in
the previous period agents formed their expectations under the belief that the
policy maker would not renege, so that unexpected inflation is based on




and the government budget constraint, eq. (A.2), we obtain the tax rate31
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Private agents take the possibility of a justified collapse in the next period
into account when forming their expectations of inflation in the mixed regime.
Thus, the expected rate of inflation from period 2-1 to period t is
(4.7)(g*)=F(g)S1 7[r21lpeginperiod i]
+ (1 -F(g))E21[r1Efloat in period fl
* *
where fly) isthe probability that g1< g .Notethat the expectation of
inflation from period 2 to period 1+1, formed in period i-i conditional on the
*
exchange rate regime being maintained, is r(y ).Thussubstituflng from eq.







where f(.) is the density of and j is its upper bound.
To calculate '('t' I g< g), we need to know the tax rate when the
policy waker pegs the exchange rate, which is given by




Thus,if we substitute into the policy maker's one-period objective, the
benefit of collapsing the exchange rate peg when Cisgiven by
(Lii) 1C(g,g* gc g*) =tç(gt,g*g<










2.Derivation of the Cost Function
tecail that the cost of collapsing the exchange rate peg when it is not
warranted equals33
r
(4.12) C"(g )= EpiIL5(g+1) -
1=1
* C * *1 + (1-F(g))B °t+j'
I >
Notethat the benefit of a justified collapse, Rt(gt,g*i g >gt),differs
*
from8°(g,g )givenin eq. (4.11) in that only the first term appears, since















Thus, since g is i.i.d, the cost of an unjustified collapse is given by
* C *1 gig..> (4.14)(gt)t
{EV(gt)z(ot,e*)+uF(Y
))B(t+j' )}




a5 2 g + 2a-g-



















3. VeIf arewidera medtegi.e
Finally,we are in a position to derive the policymaker's loss function 1
under an adjustable peg regime, L (g ).Bydefinition;
(A,15)/(gt) EtEfl2 45(g1,gt)
and thus, using eq. (4.6) in the text along with eqs. (A.9), (A.1O), and
(A.13),
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COSTS AND BENEFITS OF COLLAPSE
TRIGGER SPENDING RATE
* Restrict current spending to equal the trigger level.
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